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By its nature, money laundering is unlikely ever to be measured accurately, but estimates of its cost 
to the economy can be made using a range of data sources. This research updates estimates of the 
cost of money laundering undertaken in 1995 and identifies risk areas for money laundering in and 
through Australia. It confirms that fraud constitutes the greatest source of laundered funds, followed 
by the illegal drug trade. The sectors that survey respondents identified as most likely to be utilised 
to launder money were banking, casinos, real estate and accounting. The mechanisms identified as 
most commonly used to launder money were cash and wire transfers, credit cards and ‘payable 
through’ accounts. There was also occasional use of gold and precious metals, and cheques. The 
respondents identified real estate, further criminal activities, gambling, luxury goods and legitimate 
business as the most likely activities in which the laundered money was invested. Taking several 
different methods of estimating losses from money laundering into account, the total estimate for 
2004 was $4.5b. While Australia’s mature controls over national and international financial 
transactions place it at the lower end of the range of costs, the changing international financial 
environment and increasing sophistication of offenders mean that opportunities for new ways of 
money laundering continue to develop. Its potential to fund terrorist activities makes its identification 
and control even more pressing.
Toni Makkai
Director
The 1995 report, Estimates of the extent of money laundering in and through Australia (Walker 1995) 
suggested that around $3.5b per annum were believed to be generated by crime in Australia and 
laundered either in Australia or elsewhere, with the bulk generated by fraud and then drugs. This went 
against the prevailing international consensus, which was that the majority of laundered money was 
generated by drug offences. Since then, however, research around the world has increasingly identified 
fraud as the predominant international generator of criminal profits (compare, for example, the ACFE 
(2006) estimate of US$638b for fraud with the ONDCP (2003) estimate of US$64.8b on drugs). 
A number of issues, such as the changing nature of crime, the factors that facilitate crime such as 
technology, the rise of terrorism, and the passage of time, presented the opportunity and need to 
revisit the earlier work, to assess whether Australia’s response to money laundering more than a 
decade on continued to be effective and commensurate with the seriousness of the problem. It was 
also an opportunity to extend the analysis of the extent of money laundering to an assessment of the 
linkages of crime and money laundering in the Asia Pacific region, and to terrorism in the region.
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Worldwide concerns over the extent of 
money laundering, coupled with evidence 
that major terrorist activities have been 
facilitated by money laundering techniques, 
have significantly increased the level  
of knowledge and interest in money 
laundering. Understanding money 
laundering demands analysis of the size  
of the problem and its impacts on society. 
However, few real advances have been 
made in the quantification of money 
laundering at the regional or global levels. 
There is much reliance on former 
International Monetary Fund Managing 
Director Michel Camdessus’ frequently 
quoted estimate of two to five percent of 
global GDP (Camdessus 1988), but there is 
little evidence of the basis of this estimate. 
Apportioned to Australia these top-down 
estimates, would equate to about $10.9  
to $27.3b in 1995 terms, far in excess  
of the Walker estimation of $3.5b  
(using 2002–03 figures, the Camdessus 
estimate would suggest a range of 
$14.7–36.7b). This shortfall suggests  
that Australia’s relatively robust financial 
sector, the investment made in law 
enforcement and financial intelligence, 
and the nature of Australia’s borders  
and stability have contributed to a lower 
than global average extent of laundering. 
The recent research, conducted by John 
Walker Crimes Trends Analysis, RMIT 
University, and AUSTRAC, was based  
on questionnaires and empirical data.  
It found that the extent of money 
laundering in and through Australia  
was not significantly different from  
that in 1995. However, law enforcement 
agencies are now much more successful  
in seizing large quantities of drugs and 
identifying corrupt business practices, 
partly as a result of access to AUSTRAC’s 
financial intelligence.
This research built on the methodology  
of the 1995 report, again involving surveys 
of Australian law enforcement officials, 
and extending the survey to cover overseas 
financial intelligence units (FIUs), and 
researchers in Australia and overseas. 
Methodology 
The 1995 Walker report provided a definition 
of money laundering which graphically 
represented the relationship between costs 
of crime, proceeds of crime and money 
laundering. The expanded focus of the 2004 
study to cover the financing of terrorism 
necessitated a review of this construct, to 
include elements of the legitimate economy. 
The revised construct appears in Figure 1.
The approach asked questions regarding:
the main crime types  
and their significance 
the amount of proceeds/profit 
generated from these crimes
how the proceeds were laundered
•
•
•
where the funds were laundered
the impact of laundering on society
terrorism financing. 
The study utilised:
a survey of expert groups: law 
enforcement agencies; researchers 
and criminologists; and FIUs
review of relevant annual reports and 
examination of AUSTRAC’s database 
(financial transactions etc.) 
a review of relevant literature post-
1995, including responses to the 
1995 Walker report.
The survey
The study’s objectives and the greater 
availability of information about money 
laundering suggested a wider survey  
than the 1995 one, which was only 
conducted within Australia. In particular, 
the growth since 1995 in the global 
network of FIUs offered the possibility  
of obtaining an overseas perspective  
of laundering in and through Australia. 
The scope of the questionnaire was  
also widened to include questions 
relating to laundering methods,  
trends, and links to organised  
crime and terrorism. 
Accordingly, a range of survey documents 
were formulated, to cater for each of the 
expert groups. Altogether, the researchers 
•
•
•
•
•
•
Figure 1: Conceptual model of the economic relationships between crime, money laundering and terrorist financing
Note: The costs of crime are part of the Australian economy. The proceeds of crime are a subset of the costs. Some of the proceeds of crime in Australia are laundered, but some 
laundered money also comes from outside the Australian economy. Terrorist finance may not have criminal origins and is not necessarily laundered. The ‘known’ components are very 
small subsets of their respective estimated totals [not drawn to scale]
TE
TC Total costs of crime
TP Total proceeds of crime
KP Known proceeds of crime
TM Total money laundering
KM Known money laundering
TE Total economy
TT Total terrorist financing
KT Known terrorist financing
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received 39 responses: 21 from overseas 
FIUs, 14 from Australian law enforcement 
agencies, and four from researchers  
and criminologists.
Responses from Australia
An estimate of $3.8b for the total proceeds 
of crime generated by all crime types  
(TP in Figure 1) was derived from the 
Australian survey responses. Offences 
involving fraud and illicit drug trafficking 
again headed the list of crimes generating 
income for laundering, but when the amounts 
of money involved were compared, fraud 
exceeded drug crime by a significant 
margin. The best estimate for drug 
proceeds was $382m (considerably  
less than the estimate in the 1995 Walker 
report) while frauds collectively totalled 
$3.16b. Respondents estimated that  
on average over 80 percent of drug 
proceeds, and around 70 percent  
of the proceeds of fraud were laundered. 
The estimates of proceeds of crime and 
estimates of the percentages being 
laundered were combined to provide  
an estimate of the total amount of $2.8b 
laundered (TM in Figure 1), either within 
Australia or overseas, from the proceeds  
of Australian crime. Fraud at around  
$2.3b was by far the largest component  
of money generated and laundered  
in Australia; illicit drugs were second,  
at around $300m.
By contrast, the total value of laundered 
money involved in cases actually proceeded 
against was likely to be in the order of 
only $83m, and no data were available 
for the value of convictions recorded. 
However, the Australian law enforcement 
response was reported to have resulted 
in around $100m in restrained proceeds 
of crime, and over $21m forfeited. Illicit 
drugs to the street value of around $1b 
were seized, along with real estate to  
the value of $45m and $40m in cash.
The banking sector, casinos, the real 
estate market and the accountancy 
profession were most commonly  
believed by survey respondents  
to be utilised for money laundering  
in Australia, sending money overseas  
or receiving it from overseas. 
While the country most frequently cited  
in respect of money laundering was an 
Asian country, countries from almost all 
major world regions appeared in the list. 
Some of these are major trading partners 
of Australia, and/or have large expatriate 
or migrant communities in Australia. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the traditional  
tax havens and offshore centres in  
the Caribbean were not mentioned. 
Respondents distinguished clearly 
between countries where proceeds  
of crime were believed to be generated 
for laundering in or through Australia, 
those through which laundered money 
moved to a final destination, and countries 
regarded as final destinations of laundered 
money generated in Australia.
The research found that money  
laundering to, from, or within Australia  
was characterised by the frequent use  
of structuring transactions to avoid 
reporting requirements, accounts  
in false names, and cash smuggling.  
It is likely that launderers frequently  
used cash and wire transfers to effect 
money laundering involving Australia.  
The use of credit cards, ‘payable through’ 
accounts, and other electronic payments 
was not unusual. They occasionally used 
gold and precious metals, cheques and 
other instruments. The use of stored  
value cards was not frequent. 
The estimated $2.8b laundered in Australia 
was believed to be invested in a range  
of activities, including, as best estimates:
23 percent ($651m)  
in real estate investment
21 percent ($600m)  
in further crime activities
16 percent ($449m) in gambling
15 percent ($424m) in luxury goods 
12 percent ($345m)  
in legitimate business 
7 percent ($191m)  
in professional services.
Responses from overseas
As in Australia, overseas respondents 
mentioned fraud and drug crime most 
frequently as generators of criminal 
•
•
•
•
•
•
proceeds. Motor vehicle theft and 
prostitution were ranked higher in 
overseas countries than in Australia, 
perhaps reflecting that Australia’s water 
boundaries and distance from other 
countries offer some protection against 
offences of this type, which involve the 
physical transportation of vehicles or 
people across national borders. The 
counterpoint to this is that computer 
crime, which crosses borders without 
impediment, was of more concern to 
Australian law enforcement agencies  
than to the overseas respondents.
The survey of overseas FIUs asked about 
the relative frequency of suspected offence 
types in suspect transaction reports. 
Various forms of fraud and tax/customs 
evasion were mentioned over four times  
as often as drug trafficking. Other types of 
offence were much more rarely the subject 
of suspicious transaction reports. Countries 
differ substantially in the extent to which 
different crimes generate proceeds that 
may be laundered. In some countries, 
crime types including frauds, illegal 
prostitution and people trafficking,  
resulted in a very high percentage  
(80–90%) of the proceeds of crimes  
being laundered. Money launderers  
in other countries appeared more  
likely than their Australian counterparts  
to spend their money on lifestyle 
investments, professional services  
and corrupt or improper influences,  
and less likely to spend it on real  
estate investment and gambling.
Reflecting the global nature of the survey’s 
respondents, a wide range of countries 
were seen as linked to money laundering  
in one way or another; the most frequently 
mentioned were north American, European 
and southeast Asian countries. Eastern 
European countries were most frequently 
named as countries where the proceeds of 
crime were generated, northern and central 
European countries were associated with 
transit operations, while southeast Asia 
was mentioned most in connection with 
destinations of laundered money. 
None of the respondents regarded Australia 
as significant in any area of their own 
money laundering environment, although 
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some believed Australia was of moderate 
significance as an origin country, and others 
saw Australia as of moderate significance 
as a destination of laundered funds from 
their country. The responses to the survey 
suggested that either there was a net flow 
of money laundering out of Australia, or the 
avenues by which laundered funds flow 
back to Australia were not sufficiently  
visible to authorities.
None of the overseas respondents 
identified any terrorist financing links 
between Australia and their country.  
Their assessment of potential sources  
of terrorist funding was similar to that  
of Australian observers, in that they 
ranked donations ahead of crime  
and legitimate business. Legitimate 
business was, however, more likely  
to be highly ranked than in Australia.
Other approaches
Costs-of-crime-based estimation
The 1995 Walker analysis commenced 
with estimates of the costs of crime, 
applying percentages to derive estimates 
of the proceeds of crime, and then  
the amount likely to be laundered.  
The percentages of costs estimated  
to accrue to the offender in the form  
of proceeds, and the percentages  
of proceeds laundered were derived  
in 1995 by consensus among  
Australian criminologists. 
Mayhew (2003) subsequently updated 
estimates of the costs of crime in Australia  
in 2001–02, documenting the likely 
property losses from each crime type.  
For most crime types considered  
in Mayhew’s costs of crime estimates,  
the property losses represented the 
proceeds of crime to the offender.  
For drug crime, however, Mayhew 
incorporated other social costs,  
not related to the proceeds of crime 
accruing to the offender. Estimates  
of the proceeds of drug crime in  
Australia can, however, be derived  
from recent United Nations Office  
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2005) 
estimates of the value of illicit drugs  
trades around the world in 2002–03. 
These data can be combined with 
AUSTRAC’s 2004 survey-based  
estimates of the percentages laundered  
to give an alternative estimate of money 
laundering generated by crime in Australia. 
The resulting figure is around $6.3b, 
equally shared between fraud and drug 
offences. The difference between the 
survey-based estimates and these  
costs-of-crime-based estimates is largely  
in their perceptions of the profitability  
of the illicit drug trade in Australia,  
and may be at least partially due  
to the different dates of the estimates. 
Successes by Australian law enforcement 
in intercepting illicit drugs and breaking  
up trafficking networks may have 
significantly reduced the laundered 
proceeds of illicit drugs crime  
between 2002–03 and 2004–05. 
Suspicious transaction estimates
AUSTRACs own data (2007) on suspect 
transactions (SUSTRs) show that most 
unusual financial behaviour is reported  
by the banking and gaming sectors.  
By value, however, while financial 
institutions are still the highest reporting 
dealer type, the next highest type is the 
insurance, bullion, and securities and 
futures broker sector. The two most 
common suspected behaviours suggested 
by these reports were tax evasion  
and structuring transactions to avoid 
mandatory reporting obligations.
The trends show increases in both  
the numbers and values of SUSTRs,  
but it is difficult to know to what extent 
the increases were indicative of the 
widening scope of the legislation, 
improving accuracy in identifying 
suspicious transactions, or actual 
increases in numbers of transactions 
where a suspicion was aroused.  
It is also difficult to ascertain the extent,  
if any, to which reporting institutions are 
over-reporting suspicious transactions 
(defensive reporting), to avoid criticism  
by authorities.
While the face values of SUSTRs  
have increased over time, it must be 
recognised that these values may: 
over-represent the level of suspicious 
behaviour, as no actual offence might 
have occurred in relation to a particular 
disclosure, or
under-represent, in that the report is 
only made for that part of the subject’s 
behaviour which has come to the 
notice of the particular institution  
at that time.
Of the $123.5b total face value of SUSTRs 
in 2003–04, $122.4b related to a small 
number, each of which had a face value  
in excess of $100m and were unlikely  
to have actually been completed. 
Analysis of international funds transfers
Analysis of international funds transfer 
instruction reports would, on the face  
of it, be a very useful means of identifying 
money laundering flows in and out of 
Australia. If illicit drugs payments, for 
example, were significant enough to 
become identifiable in the data, it would 
be expected that more money would  
be sent to drug producer countries than  
is received from them. The data showed 
no such relationship. Similarly, analysis  
of flows to and from known tax havens 
neither conclusively pointed to money 
laundering between particular countries 
nor suggested how much of the flow of 
funds between countries was laundered 
proceeds of crime. 
Estimates of the shadow economy
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (2003) 
estimated that an adjustment to GDP 
figures for 2000–01 to reflect the extent  
of the underground economy was 
warranted, in the order of 1.3 percent,  
or $8.4b. By contrast, Schneider (2004) 
estimated that the Australian shadow 
economy could be in the order of  
13.5 percent of GDP.
Trade pricing anomalies
Zdanowicz (2003) studied trade pricing 
anomalies involving the United States  
and other countries. He concluded that 
transfer pricing, where a business falsely 
under- or over-states the value of an 
export or import, is a highly effective  
•
•
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way to launder money. Zdanowicz found 
anomalous trade between the US and 
Australia, in the order of US$1.84b (7% 
of total trade between the two countries). 
Proceeds of crime recoveries
Some of the proceeds of crime in Australia 
are clearly identified in data on prosecutions 
under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 
Statistics from the Australian Federal  
Police (2004) indicate an annual average  
of orders made over the period 1999–2000 
to 2003–04 in the region of $30.9m,  
with recoveries averaging $8.6m. 
These figures, however, are clearly not 
measuring the totality of either the proceeds 
of crime or money laundering in and 
through Australia. The Commonwealth 
Director of Public Prosecutions (2004: 39) 
suggested that:
the amount recovered can not be 
the sole measure of the effectiveness 
of the legislation. The true test  
is whether the Act is operating  
to punish and deter crime and  
to disrupt criminal enterprises.
What these estimates show
While the survey estimates were based on 
considerable local knowledge of Australia 
and the major crimes that come to official 
notice, they may have underestimated the 
extent or the profits of crimes that never 
come to public notice, including both 
fraud and drug crimes, particularly  
as they were based on a small number  
of respondents to the survey. The approach 
using the work of Mayhew and the UNODC 
specifically addressed estimates of 
unrecorded crime, and may be less 
susceptible to that type of error,  
but relied on much higher estimates  
of the profitability of the illicit drug markets  
in Australia. An assessment of the various 
estimates, however, leads to a conclusion 
that crime in Australia in 2004 generated 
between $2.8b and $6.3b, with the most 
likely figure being in the vicinity of $4.5b. 
Although this is well below the likely 
Australian component of the IMF figure  
of two to five percent of global GDP,  
the analyses also identified significant 
areas of hard-to-quantify shadow 
economy and transfer pricing practices 
that may involve significant underpayment 
of tax. Practices like these can be used 
by Australian launderers or by overseas 
launderers seeking to launder money 
through Australia. They could increase 
the total money laundered in and through 
Australia considerably. For Australia,  
two to five percent of GDP would 
suggest a figure between $14.7  
and $36.7b laundered in 2002–03. 
Research was not able to determine  
the components that constitute this IMF 
figure, making Australian comparisons 
extremely difficult. That is, does it just 
relate to drugs, fraud and other criminal 
offences, or does it include factors such 
as the shadow economy and transfer 
pricing? It also raises the question as  
to the relevant proportion for Australia, 
with its robust economy and financial 
sector. Would Australia be at the lower 
end of a scale, perhaps falling well below 
the lower bound of two percent of GDP? 
The values of other statistical aggregates, 
including suspect transaction reports, 
international funds transfer instructions 
and proceeds of crime orders, can  
only be a guide to the actual extent  
of money laundering.
Impacts of money  
laundering on the economy
Survey respondents and other information 
suggested that launderers generally 
invested their proceeds of crime into real 
estate or other sterile assets such as high 
value luxury items. If a figure of $4.5b  
is taken as the value of money laundering  
in Australia, and that of this, approximately 
23 percent is invested into real estate, 
nearly $1b is reallocated from other sectors 
(that is, the normal consumption of victims 
and drug users) to real estate. The ownership 
of dwellings sector yields the lowest 
economic benefits for each dollar invested 
in the sector of all sectors, in terms of output, 
income, imports and employment. It is 
therefore possible to consider the economic 
multiplier effects of this reallocation, in terms 
of the changes to economic output, demand 
for level of income, imports, and employment. 
For each $1m reallocated to real estate, 
there could be average net losses to the 
economy of around $1.436m in output, 
$576,000 in income and 20 jobs. 
The launderer’s need to launder funds can 
also result in distortive effects on the prices 
of investments such as real estate, because 
the need to find a safe investment is more 
important than price. 
Launderers may also seek to legitimise 
their earnings by mingling illicit funds  
with proceeds from legitimate businesses 
Figure 2: Estimates of money laundered in and through Australia ($b)
POC recovered
POC forfeiture orders made
Suspicious transactions
Survey based
Mayhew/UNODC
IFTIs
Transfer pricing
IMF estimates
Shadow economy
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(generally those with high cash turnover). 
Again, this method of laundering is often 
done at any cost, even to the extent  
of operating a business at a loss and 
subsidising its business operations  
with contributions from criminal earnings. 
This exerts downwards pressures on 
prices, and tends to crowd out legitimate 
business competitors. 
Further, money laundering has wider 
implications for the economy, including:
the risk of corruption to institutions 
and some entire financial sectors
losses to the financial and 
government sectors are recovered 
from the community in the forms  
of higher prices for their services
misleading monetary data changes  
in savings patterns.
The financing of terrorism
It is generally accepted that some of the 
main methods utilised by the financiers  
of terrorism include the misuse of charities, 
the informal funds transfer sector, wire 
transfers, and precious and durable 
commodities. Other methods can include 
trade mispricing, and intellectual property 
crime (Noble 2003). Very little is known 
about amounts of terrorist financing,  
and there is some risk in assuming that  
a person who is the subject of a SUSTR 
is the same person named on government-
proscribed lists. The simple match of  
a name does not of itself mean that the 
reported person is linked to the financing 
of terrorism. The research suggests that  
it would be naïve to assume that no funds 
used for the financing of terrorism had 
originated in Australia. However, the survey 
•
•
•
responses provided no conclusive evidence 
of terrorist financing in Australia or in  
the region.
Further research
The study identified some areas of further 
research, particularly a consideration  
of trade values compared with funds 
transfers, and the possible use of 
alternative payment technologies for 
money laundering. Other work could 
explore the extent of trade mispricing 
involving Australia. The greatest need, 
however, is for internationally comparable 
data on the proceeds of crime and money 
laundering. This requires a consistent 
method that can be adopted widely.
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